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NON-INCUMBENT
COMPETITION:
MERGERS INVOLVING
CONSTRAINING AND PROSPECTIVE
COMPETITIORS
John E. Kwokal
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, merger analysis by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment ("DOJ") has been significantly improved by several devel-
opments. More sophisticated use of concentration-share thresholds,
the theory of unilateral effects, more explicit standards for evaluating
entry, and the treatment of efficiencies, among other changes, have
made successive versions of the Merger Guidelines a better reflection
of underlying economics, a more precise enforcement tool, and more
helpful to businesses and to the courts. With respect at least to one
important area of concern, however, current analysis of mergers has
not only failed to advance but, indeed, has regressed. That area is
commonly known, but not well described, by the term "potential
competition."
The classic form of a merger involving a "potential competitor"
concerns an incumbent Firm A that merges with or acquires Firm B
(the roles may be reversed). Firm B is currently outside the relevant
market but is (or is viewed by incumbents as) a plausible entrant, and
its entry (or perceived threat to enter) measurably strengthens compe-
t Neil F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor, Department of Economics, Northeastern
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tition. At first glance the anticompetitive effects of such a merger
may seem as clear as those flowing from a merger between actual
producers of the good in question. After all, the elimination of a
threatening competitor relaxes the constraint on existing firms in
much the same manner as the elimination of a current competitor.
For various reasons, however, both the courts and the antitrust agen-
cies have treated mergers involving such "non-incumbent competi-
tors" fundamentally differently from those involving existing firms.
Indeed, at present the judicial view toward non-incumbent competi-
tion is one of considerable skepticism, with evidentiary hurdles so
high, in the words of some observers, as to "virtually repeal the
potential competition doctrine."'
The result of this judicial attitude is that the FTC and DOJ have
been reluctant to bring cases that depend crucially and obviously on
such considerations. Instead, the agencies have responded either by
not challenging some mergers that have such anticompetitive poten-
tial, or by emphasizing other competitive concerns instead of poten-
tial competition in order to escape quick judicial rejection. Neither of
these approaches represents good policy, of course. Here we shall
argue that this kind of avoidance is unnecessary as well. Such avoid-
ance is unnecessary because the reasons for the courts' skepticism
with respect to this doctrine-if they were ever well-founded--can be
put to rest by advances in two areas: first, in the economic theory and
empirical evidence regarding non-incumbent competitors, and sec-
ond, in the development of criteria for identifying non-incumbent
firms that matter to the competitive process.
This paper reviews the history of the "potential competition"
doctrine and then focuses on conceptual and practical advances that
resolve past concerns. We define two types of non-incumbent firms
that matter-a "constraining competitor" and a "prospective competi-
tor." A constraining competitor is a non-incumbent firm that is
viewed by incumbents as a threat to enter and thus imposes a very
real constraint on their current pricing and other decisions. A merger
eliminating such a firm directly relaxes the constraint faced by in-
cumbent firms. The term "prospective competitor" denotes a firm
that has the incentive and capability actually to initiate production.
Its elimination by merger negates its likely entry and the industry de-
concentration that would result.2
1 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 11.3b3,
at 622 (2000).
2 The terms "constraining competitor" and "prospective competitor" denote firms analo-
gous to those termed in the literature a "perceived potential competitor" and an "actual potential
competitor," respectively. The present terminology is superior in that it connotes the very real
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We employ the concepts of constraining and prospective com-
petitors as the basis for proposed guidelines for evaluating the likely
competitive effects of mergers involving non-incumbent companies.
This proposal is consistent with modem economic analysis and with
the basic framework of the Merger Guidelines, and that it can be both
helpful to the antitrust enforcement process and convincing to the
courts.
Part II of this article reviews the judicial and enforcement his-
tory of the potential competition doctrine, since it is that history that
has led to the present policy conundrum. Part III discusses modem
economic theory and empirical evidence with respect to non-
incumbent competition-theory and evidence that forms the founda-
tion for this revisiting of past doctrine. Part IV addresses the issue of
operational criteria for identifying non-incumbent competitors that
matter, and then proposes new standards for analyzing mergers in-
volving such firms. Part V concludes.
I. POTENTIAL COMPETITION: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
BACKGROUND
The doctrine of potential competition first arose in a number of
antitrust cases in the 1960s and was formally integrated into merger
analysis in the early 1980s. At about the same time, however, Su-
preme Court rulings sharply reduced its applicability. Over the past
twenty years the doctrine has been employed less often, typically as a
secondary issue, and often cloaked in other language. The following
section reviews this judicial and enforcement history, which forms the
basis for current policy.
A. Early Potential Competition Cases
The first case that raised the issue of potential competition in an
important way was United States v. El Paso Gas Co.3 El Paso was a
supplier of natural gas to customers in California and sought to ac-
quire Pacific Northwest Pipeline Company. Pacific Northwest had
substantial reserves of gas outside California and, while it sold no gas
there, it had repeatedly considered entering, even on occasion bidding
to supply utilities in that state. After reviewing evidence that Pacific
Northwest's bids in fact altered El Paso's prices, the Supreme Court
concluded that "the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into the
California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on
(not merely potential or perceived) economic impact of such firms. It also avoids the baggage
associated with earlier terminology.
' 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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El Paso's business attitudes within the state.' 4 The Court observed
that "unsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than successful
ones" and upheld the government's challenge to the acquisition.5
The El Paso case established the proposition that competition
from firms outside the market mattered both in fact and in the law.
Subsequent cases sharpened the distinction between the types of ef-
fects, and the types of non-incumbent competitors, that mattered.
When Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") sought to acquire Clorox, P&G
argued that it never actually intended to enter the liquid bleach market
by itself, and indeed no evidence was introduced to the contrary. Re-
versing the lower court in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,6 the Su-
preme Court nonetheless prohibited the acquisition on the theory that
P&G in some objective sense could have entered, that it was the sin-
gle most likely entrant, and that "[i]f Proctor had actually entered,
Clorox's dominant position would have been eroded and the concen-
tration of the industry reduced."7 Thus, the acquisition was deemed
illegal because, by eliminating a plausible entrant, it prevented the
prospective deconcentration of the industry. This theory came to be
known as "actual potential competition," reflecting the belief that,
absent the merger, the non-incumbent actually would have entered the
market, thereby rendering it more competitive.
If Proctor & Gamble stood for the proposition that an objective
assessment of the likelihood of entry might suffice, the subsequently-
decided United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.8 emphasized that
perception by itself could be decisive as well. Falstaff acquired Nar-
ragansett beer in order to extend its reach into New England, arguing
successfully to the lower courts that it never intended to enter that
region by building a new brewery. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, asserting that the issue "is not what Falstaff's internal
company decisions were but whether, given its financial capabilities
and conditions in the New England market, it would be reasonable to
consider it a potential entrant into that market."9
If so, Falstaff s presence on the "fringe of the market" likely in-
fluenced the behavior of other New England firms, and its entry by
acquisition would eliminate that competitive restraint.10 This scenario
was (and is) conventionally termed "perceived potential competition,"
4 Id. at 659.
5 Id. at 661.
6 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
7 Id. at 575.
8 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
9 Id. at 533.
10 See id. Upon rehearing, the lower court found that the government failed to carry its
burden.
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since the non-incumbent firm is considered a threat to enter and thus
its elimination reduces the constraint on incumbent firms. The dis-
tinction between perceived and actual potential competition is an im-
portant one, both analytically and in the history of this doctrine.
A substantial number of other potential competition cases in
this period of time arose in the context of then-common concern with
conglomerate mergers and in the context of the formation of joint
ventures. Joint ventures take the concept of potential competition one
step further in that they often involve two firms neither of which cur-
rently produce in the relevant market. One notable example involved
a joint venture between Pennsalt Chemicals and Olin Mathieson
Corp. which was to manufacture a chemical product in the southeast-
ern states. While both companies had contemplated entering that
market by themselves, the joint venture combined Pennsalt's exper-
tise in product manufacture with Olin's presence as a supplier of other
chemical products in the region. The District Court engaged in a
"head count" approach, approving the arrangement in the belief that
both firms would not have independently entered the relevant mar-
ket.1 Having concluded that one new entity was the maximum to be
expected, it found no reason to disprefer the joint venture.
Upon review, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,12 the
Supreme Court ruled otherwise, arguing that even if it were true that
only one entity would actually enter, there was another outcome com-
petitively preferable to joint venture entry. Absent the joint venture,
either Pennsalt or Olin might have entered independently while the
other remained "at the edge of the market, continually threatening to
enter.' 3 The Court judged this to be a more competitive outcome
and a possibility that the lower court therefore needed to consider.
14
A subsequent case gave the Court the opportunity to articulate
its overall approach to potential competition, one that has governed
enforcement to this date. A large Seattle bank, Marine Bancorpora-
tion, sought to acquire a midsize bank in Spokane. The government
successfully challenged the acquisition in district court, but in United
States v. Marine Bancorporation,15 the Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that Marine Bancorporation could not have been seen as a
1 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 130-31 (D. Del. 1963), va-
cated by 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
j2 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
13 Id. at 173.
14 See id. Upon rehearing, the district court concluded that neither of the two firms would
have entered independently and so let the joint venture stand. The government again appealed
to the Supreme Court. This time the Court was evenly divided, preserving the district court's
ruling. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
15 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
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likely entrant into Spokane since state banking laws virtually prohib-
ited de novo entry into another region.16 The language of the Court
has proven to be crucial:
Unequivocal proof that an acquiring firm actually would
have entered de novo but for a merger is rarely available..
• . Thus .... the principal focus of the doctrine is on the
likely effects of the premerger position of the acquiring
firm on the fringe of the target market... [A] market ex-
tension merger may be unlawful if the target market is
substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm has the
characteristics, capability, and economic incentive to ren-
der it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the ac-
quiring firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the
market in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part
of existing participants in that market.
17
The first sentence of this excerpt acknowledges the possibility
of a non-incumbent firm that is a bona fide prospective entrant (an
"actual potential competitor"). At the same time, however, the Court
expressed its deep doubt about this possibility and made clear how
difficult it would be to prove this to its satisfaction. The dearth of
cases based on such argument attests to the impracticality of meeting
the burden of proof, leading observers to declare the doctrine of ac-
tual potential competition "moribund." 18
Regarding perceived potential competition, the Court articu-
lated a standard involving proof of three elements: (1) The market in
question must be concentrated; (2) the non-incumbent firm must
have the "characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to ren-
der it a perceived potential de novo entrant;" and (3) the non-
incumbent firm must have "in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on
the part of existing market participants. ' 19  The stringency of this
standard reflected the Court's unease with-indeed, skepticism con-
16 Id. at 636.
17 Id. at 624-25.
18 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 1, § 11.3b, at 621. It certainly has been moribund
as a primary enforcement tool, although as we shall see, potential competition has continued to
play a supporting role in some cases. For other recent reviews, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, Fed-
eral Trade Commission Innovation and the Assessment of Competitive Effects, in ANTICIPATING
THE 2 1sT CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 10
(1996); David Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61 (1999) (assessing DOJ and FFC antitrust enforcement performance in such areas
as merger, high tech markets, distribution, and dominant firm conduct).
19 Marine Bancorporation., 418 U.S. at 624-25.
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cerning-this doctrine as well. The stringency is apparent by con-
trasting the criteria to those of conventional merger analysis. Particu-
larly the third element-proof of an actual constraining effect-has
no real counterpart in the evaluation of mergers between existing
firms. Evaluation of incumbent-firm mergers are grounded in both
economic theory and empirical evidence as to the importance of all
firms in a small-number setting, but there is no requirement to show
that any specific firm demonstrably constrains others. 20  The much
higher standard for perceived potential competition articulated in Ma-
rine Bancorporation and reinforced by lower court decisions2' has
resulted in few such cases being brought in the federal courts.
The FTC has sought to strike a more sympathetic posture to-
wards doctrine of potential competition, but it too has raised substan-
tial evidentiary burdens. In In re B.A.T Industries,22 the agency con-
sidered whether the company would have entered the U.S. market for
chemical carbonless paper had it not acquired the leading current U.S.
producer. The FTC stated that the argument regarding entry requires
"clear proof of concrete internal plans for independent entry that have
been at least tacitly approved at the governing levels of corporate
management. ' 23 Not only was that standard not met in B.A.T, but it
has posed an enormous hurdle to subsequent cases as well. Indeed
the most recent former FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky, has charac-
terized the B.A.T. standard as "gut[ting] the actual potential competi-
tion doctrine. '
24
At about the same time as the B.A.T. case, the FTC ruled on the
proposed joint venture between General Motors ("GM") and Toyota
to produce a small car in California for the U.S. market.2 A key is-
sue in the investigation was whether either GM or Toyota (or both)
would otherwise have undertaken a similar project, so that the joint
venture did not represent an incremental producing entity. There was
in fact substantial evidence that GM had considered an alternative
venture with Isuzu, a far less important rival than Toyota. In addition,
Toyota was known to be the lowest-cost Japanese producer, so that its
20 While there is no requirement, the theory of unilateral effects directs attention to firm-
specific impacts of a merger. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Economics and the
1992 Merger Guidelines: A Brief Survey, 8 REv. INDUS. ORG. 139 (1993).
21 See Tenneco v. FrC, 689 F.2d 346, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing potential competition
rule of Marine Bancorporation); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24,26 (2d Cir. 1977) (same).
22 104 F.T.C. 852 (1984) (affirming dismissal order).
SId. at 930.
24 Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust
Approaches, Address to the Glasser Legal/Works Seminar on Competitive Policy in Communi-
cations Industries, Washington, DC, at http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ newcomm.html
(Mar. 10, 1997).
25 General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent decree).
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elimination as a possible independent entrant significantly raised the
constraint (up to the level of the next lowest-cost producer, namely,
Honda) on existing firms' prices. Despite this, the FTC approved the
joint venture, while seeking to preserve GM as an actual potential
entrant by limiting its output from the venture with Toyota.26
This history reveals that, from the 1960s until the early
1980s, the doctrine of potential competition was undergoing evolution
in the courts and the enforcement agencies. From initial acceptance
of (or at least interest in) the doctrine, the courts became increasingly
concerned with two issues: the certainty and precision of the impact
of non-incumbent firms, and the ability to identify a non-incumbent
firm that truly mattered. By the end of this period, a deep skepticism
had developed about this doctrine and, while not rejecting it out of
hand, the courts proceeded to erect high hurdles for disapproval of
mergers involving such firms. The result-no doubt, the intent-was
that few prospects remained for successful challenge of mergers in-
volving non-incumbent competitors.
B. Merger Guidelines and Potential Competition
Despite the Marine Bancorporation case, the nearly simultane-
ous 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines endorsed the concern with
mergers that "eliminat[ed] specific potential entrants. 27 Section 4.11
of those Guidelines articulated an explicit "theory of potential compe-
tition,' 28 stating that a merger removing a firm at the "edge of the
market" could harm competition in either of two ways:
* Harm to "perceived potential competition" by
the elimination of "a significant present com-
petitive threat that constrains the behavior of
firms already in the market,' 29 or
* Harm to "actual potential competition" by
eliminating "the possibility of entry by the ac-
quiring firm in a more procompetitive man-
ner."
30
26 See id. at 383-84. This limitation did not succeed in inducing GM's entry in any other
fashion. For a full description of this case, see John E. Kwoka Jr., International Joint Venture:
General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS 46
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1994).
27 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982) reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102, at 20,531 (Jun. 14, 1982). See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) re-
printed in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,564-65 (Jun. 14, 1984).
28 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 4.11.
29 Id. § 4.111.
30 Id. § 4.112.
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The Guidelines stated explicitly that mergers raising either con-
cern would be evaluated under a "single structural analysis analogous
to that applied to horizontal mergers ' 31 and set out the following fac-
tors as relevant: market concentration, conditions of entry generally,
the acquiring firm's entry advantage, the market share of the acquired
firm, and efficiencies.32 More specifically, no challenge would occur
if entry into the market is generally easy or if more than a few firms
have the same or a comparable advantage in entering. "More than a
few" was interpreted to mean where "the entry advantage ascribed to
the acquiring firm (or another advantage of comparable importance)
is also possessed by three or more other firms.' '33
The 1982/1984 Merger Guidelines largely correspond to the
spirit of cases prior to the Marine Bancorporation decision, cases that
recognized both perceived and actual potential entrants as elements of
the competitive analysis. But with that decision and others that
sharply limited the applicability of the doctrine of potential competi-
tion, enforcement practice changed dramatically. Subsequent ver-
sions of the Merger Guidelines incorporated potential competition
concerns only by reference to earlier versions of the guidelines.34 A
recent chief economist at the Antitrust Division has described the ef-
fect on enforcement as 'making such cases "so rare as to make the
whole notion virtually absent from antitrust."35
While there is indeed no further mention of potential competi-
tion, the 1992 revision of the Merger Guidelines made at least one
change that reflected concern with certain non-incumbent firms.
Those Guidelines define as market participants both current producers
and so-called "uncommitted entrants.,,36 The latter are firms that,
while not currently producing in the relevant market, have sufficiently
modest sunk costs as to enable them to initiate a supply response
within a year in response to a small but significant and nontransitory
31 Id. § 4.113. Mergers involving potential competition were denoted "non-horizontal"
because the firms were currently operating in the same market. This terminology is misleading,
however, since their effect is entirely "horizontal" in the sense of affecting pricing of the prod-
uct produced or capable of being produced by the merging firrns.
32 L §§ 4.131,4.132,4.133,4.134,4.135.
" L 4.133.
3 See ABA ANTTrRusT SECrION, THE 1992 HoPizoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: COM-
mENTARY AND TExT 21 (1992) (noting in the statement accompanying release of the revised
guidelines that "[n]either agency has changed its policy with respect to non-horizontal mergers"
and alluding to Section 4 of the 1984 version, but otherwise containing no explicit discussion of
the issues).
-1 Andrew S. Joskow, Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, 16 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 185, 189 (2000).
36 DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.32
(rev. ed. 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569 (Apr. 8, 1997) [here-
inafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES].
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price increase.37 As market participants, uncommitted entrants in
principle are to be assigned market shares and made part of the calcu-
lation of overall concentration. Of course, since their actual output
definitionally is zero, share assignment would have to be based on
capacity or some other valid method of anticipating production.
In principle, the concept of uncommitted entrants would seem
to recognize competition from non-incumbent firms that are prospec-
tive entrants within a short time frame. Yet this concept has several
limitations as a mechanism for addressing the loss of competition
from non-incumbent firms. First, the emphasis in the analysis on
sunk costs and timeliness of responses implies a focus on "actual po-
tential competition." "Perceived potential competition"-the version
of the doctrine with which the courts have seemed more comfortable
and which is acknowledged in earlier Guidelines-appears to fall out-
side the scope of uncommitted entry. Second, firms whose response
time is longer than one year ("committed entrants") are not treated as
market participants in the current Guidelines and, indeed, are recog-
nized only insofar as they affect the condition of entry and thereby the
market power of incumbent firms. The Guidelines are effectively
silent on the consequences of a merger involving a "committed en-
trant." We shall return to the Guidelines' treatment of committed en-
try in Part IV.
C. More Recent Cases Involving Potential Competition
Despite the legal impediments to claims of potential competi-
tion, a number of more recent merger investigations and complaints,
and even a few cases, have raised the issue in some fashion. The fol-
lowing cases illustrate the nature of continuing enforcement actions.
The FTC has raised potential competition issues in a modest
number of mergers over the past decade. Three involved pharmaceu-
tical or other medical supply industries. In Hoechst AG38 and Zeneca
Group,39 the Commission alleged that by merger and contractual
agreement the parties eliminated a significant source of prospective
competition for particular drugs. In Boston Scientific Corp.,40 the
complaint alleged that the company's acquisitions of two smaller
competitors eliminated "the most likely potential entrant" and "an
actual potential competitor" into a highly concentrated market for a
37 Earlier guidelines defined a similar category of "production substitutors" who were to
be considered part of the market, but they received much more cursory treatment.
31 1999 WL 378815 (F.T.C. June 7, 1999), 120 F.T.C. 1010 (1995).
'9 F.T.C. Dkt. No. C-3880 (June 7, 1999).
40 Boston Scientific Corp., 119 F.T.C. 549 (1996).
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particular type of catheter.4' In each instance the potential competi-
tion claim played a significant role. The FTC avoided trial in each
case by securing a coisent order providing for divestiture or licensing
of assets required to preserve competition.
Another group of FTC cases has involved mergers and acquisi-
tions in various retail markets. In FTC v. Staples, Inc. and Office De-
pot, Inc. ,42 the matter of Staples' proposed merger with Office Depot,
the principle argument involved the reduction of competition between
the two office superstores, but the district court opinion also endorsed
the view that "allowing the defendants to merge would eliminate sig-
nificant future competition. Absent the merger, the firms are likely,
and in fact have planned, to enter more of each other's markets, lead-
ing to a deconcentration of the market and, therefore, increased com-
petition between the superstores.' 43 Some observers have noted simi-
lar secondary claims regarding the loss of potential competition in the
mergers of Kroger and Fred Meyer, Ahold and Giant, and Albertson's
and American Stores.44 In each case the FTC required divestiture of
assets sufficient to prevent the loss of an independent competitor in
particular markets.
Significant cases involving potential competition issues at the
Antitrust Division have arisen in the telecommunications and airlines
industries, among others. The Bell Atlantic-NYNEX merger (1996)
and that between Southern Bell Co.-Ameritech (1999) each repre-
sented consolidations between Bell operating companies with adja-
cent territories. 45 A central issue in both mergers was whether, absent
the merger, one company would have entered into local telephone
service in the other's territory. There was abundant evidence that
Bell Atlantic had indeed contemplated entry into NYNEX's historic
monopoly territory, notably the New York City calling area.46 In the
second case, SBC was found to be planning to expand into Ameri-
tech's Chicago market, while Ameritech would otherwise have en-
tered into St. Louis, in SBC's territory. In each case the parties
claimed there were other equally well-positioned potential entrants as
41 See id. at 553.
42 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997)
43 Id. at 1082. For a full description of this case, see Serdar Dalkir & Frederick R. War-
ren-Boulton, Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 143 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed. 1999).
4 See David A. Balto, Supermarket Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST REP., Aug. 1999,
at 2 (examining eight litigated supermarket mergers).
45 The earlier SBC merger with Pacific Tel involved non-adjacent Bell Operating Com-
panies.
46 See Steven R. Brenner, Potential Competition in Local Telephone Service: Bell Atlan-
tic-NYNEX (1997), in THE ANTiTRUST REVOLUTION (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White
eds., 3d ed. 1999).
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well as other constraints on incumbents' market power. The DOJ
approved both mergers without revealing how it analyzed the poten-
tial competition issues.
47
For telecommunications mergers, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") also has oversight authority and undertook its
own competition analysis of the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX and the SBC-
Ameritech mergers. In the former case the FCC opinion explicitly
endorsed an actual potential competition approach, setting out five
necessary elements of the doctrine:
(1) The market in question ("the target market") is highly
concentrated; (2) few other potential entrants are "equiva-
lent" to the company that proposes to enter the target mar-
ket by merger; (3) the company entering the target market
by merger was reasonably likely to have entered the mar-
ket but for the proposed merger; (4) that company had
other feasible means of entry; and (5) such alternative
means of entry offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately
producing de-concentration in the target market or other
significant pro-competitive effects. 48
Based on these considerations, the FCC concluded that Bell Atlantic
was an actual potential competitor in Manhattan and proceeded to
assign hypothetical market shares based on confidential market re-
search data.49 The actual calculations implied that the proposed
merger raised significant competitive concerns.
50
Similar issues were raised by SBC's merger with Ameritech.
The FCC stated that its potential competition analysis "builds upon,
47 In the Bell Atlantic-Nynex case, it did so with a brief statement that it found no antitrust
violation. The SBC-Ameritech merger was subject to divestiture of some cellular assets.
48 FCC File No. NSD-L-96-10, 138 (August 14, 1999) (opinion and order), at
http:llwww.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carriers/Orders/1997/fcc9728.txt. It is worth noting that
other regulatory agencies with a role in overseeing mergers have considered similar arguments.
For example, potential competition arguments have been made before the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission. See American Elec. Power Co. and Cent. and South West Corp., FERC
Dkt. No. EC98-40-000, (June 1998) (motion to intervene and protest of the APPA and
NRECA).
49 This imputation of market shares to a firm that had no current presence in the market in
question is contemplated in the Merger Guidelines treatment of uncommitted entrants, as dis-
cussed before, but the FCC's actual reliance upon these shares may be unprecedented. The
chief economist at the Antitrust Division at the time has cited the FCC's methodology approv-
ingly. See Joskow, supra note 35. For a description of this proceeding, see Brenner, supra note
46.
50 Given its view of the competitive effects, it seemed paradoxical to many observers that
the Commission nonetheless approved the merger, albeit subject to a number of conditions and
commitments intended to hasten the advent of competition in NYNEX's territory.
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but does not attempt to copy, the 'actual potential competition' doc-
trine established in antitrust case law."51 Among the important differ-
ences, it asserted that telecommunications represents a "transitional
market," moving from regulated monopoly status to a more open en-
vironment, in which evidence of potential competitors might take new
forms. Specifically, prospective competitors might include firms that
have the incentive and ability to enter but have been unable to do so
because of regulatory barriers.52 The FCC determined that each of
these Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") represented so-called
"precluded competitors" into the other's territory-that is, firms that
would be potential competitors but for regulation itself-and that the
merger between them harmed competition and the public interest.
5 3
DOJ has cited potential competition concerns in other cases.
These include Primestar's acquisition of the certain assets of News
Corp. and MCI, the proposed merger of Signature and AMR
Combs, Northwest's acquisition of a controlling stake in Continen-
tal Airlines, and the proposed United Airlines acquisition of US
Airways. Each of these deserves brief comment. Since Primestar
was controlled by five cable operators, the acquisition would have
eliminated the cable companies' most significant potential com-
petitor-News Corp's ASkyB venture-and prevented any inde-
pendent firm from using the assets to compete with Primestar's
owners' cable systems.5 4  Signature/AMR Combs and North-
west/Continental both involved actual as well as potential competi-
tion concerns. Signature had undisputed plans to enter into flight
support services at two airports served only by AMR.55 In the
Northwest-Continental case, the Justice Department complaint ex-
plicitly alleged that the arrangement:
51 FCC CC Dkt. No. 98-141, 64 (October 8, 1999) (opinion and order), at
http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaulCommonCarrierOrders/1999fcc99279.doc.
52 The FCC explicitly noted that in such markets "firms may be included as significant
competitors even though they may have yet to manifest a firm intention to enter or to invest
substantially in preparation for entry." FCC CC Dkt. No. 98-141, at 64, n.142, at
http:llwww.fcc.gov/BureaulCommon.Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99279.doc.
53 As it had done with Bell Atlantic-Nynex, however, the FCC nonetheless approved the
merger subject to a lengthy list of conditions and commitments by the parties designed to open
up their territories to local exchange competition. In the context of these mergers the DOJ ap-
parently considered whether in transitional markets there was added reason to preserve potential
entrants, given the fact there was only one incumbent and no history of entry and exit. It appar-
ently concluded that no special treatment was necessary. See Joskow, supra note 35.
54 See Complaint at 17-18, United States v. Primestar, No. 1:98CV01193 (D.D.C. May 12,
1998), available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/index.htm. For a fuller description of this
case, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct Broad-
cast Satellite Assets, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193 (2000).
55 See United States v. Signature Flight Support Corp., 1999-2 Trade Cas. 72,611
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1999) (final judgment).
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will diminish the potential for nonstop competition for Mem-
phis-Cleveland and Memphis-Newark, as well as potential
competition in other markets for which Northwest and Conti-
nental are among the few likely future providers of scheduled
airline passenger service. As a result, fares likely will in-
crease and service likely will decrease in these city pairs. 56
Similarly, in the proposed United-US Airways consolidation, the
Justice Department noted among its concerns that "United is the most
likely airline to enter" seven hub-to-hub nonstop markets dominated
by US Airways.5 7 In the first three cases the Justice Department se-
cured settlements involving divestitures or other modifications that
resolved its stated concerns. In the fourth. United abandoned its plan
to acquire US Airways for multiple reasons, including the Justice De-
partment's threatened suit.
This group of cases suggests that both the FTC and the Justice
Department have continued to find the doctrine of potential competi-
tion useful in formulating objections to certain mergers, but both have
been cautious in the manner in which they raise it. Moreover, both
have sought to resolve such cases by consent orders rather than litiga-
tion, since orders are effective means for achieving much of what the
agencies might seek without exposing their arguments to a skeptical
judiciary. Thus, potential competition may be described as the stealth
doctrine of modern antitrust-staying alive by flying under the judi-
cial radar. In the next two Parts, we argue that this approach is no
longer necessary, as advances in economics have resolved the courts'
concerns with this doctrine.
1I. THE ECONOMICS OF NON-INCUMBENT COMPETITION
Particularly over the past twenty years, there have been signifi-
cant advances in economic theory and in empirical evidence regard-
ing the effects of non-incumbent firms and entry generally. These
advances substantially close prior gaps in our understanding. They
give insight into which mergers are likely to have anticompetitive
effects. And ultimately they provide grounds for reconsidering the
present judicial skepticism toward non-incumbent firm mergers. Here
56 Complaint at 6, United States v. Northwest Airlines and Continental Airlines, No. 98-
74611 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 1998), available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/index.htm.
57 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice and Several States
will Sue to Stop United Airlines from Acquiring U.S. Airways, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opal
pr/2001/July/361at.htm (July 27, 2001).
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we review that theory and evidence. This Part will address the issue
of identifying problematic markets and firms in the context of actual
merger cases.
A. Constraining Competition and Deconstraining Mergers: Theory
Economic theory is quite clear as to how a non-incumbent firm
may constrain the behavior of incumbent firms. Strands of that the-
ory date back at least to Joe Bain, who described the effect of a poten-
tial entrant thus: 'The condition of entry.... determines the relative
force of potential competition as an influence or regulator on the con-
duct and performance in a market. ' 58 From Bain's insight flowed
models of limit pricing-the highest price the incumbent can charge
without inducing entry-and other theoretical approaches that formal-
ized the relationship between incumbent and non-incumbent firms.
59
For expository purposes here we adopt the framework of modem oli-
gopoly theory.
Simple theory illustrates the anticompetitive effects of merg-
ers that eliminate a constraining competitor. Assume an industry
with only a few firms, where each such firm maximizes its profit,
denoted 7t:
It = qj P(Q) - C(q-) (1)
Here qi denotes its own output and C(qi) its costs. P(Q) is market
demand, a function of the total output Q of all firms. Firm i maxi-
mizes its profit by differentiating this expression with respect to its
output and setting the result equal to zero. This is equivalent to
setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, thus:
P(Q) + qi [aP(Q)/aqd = aC/Dqi (2)
Here the a notation signifies the partial derivative. The term aC/aqi
denotes marginal cost and aP(Q)/aqi is the effect on market price of
firm i's own output change. The latter is comprised of two compo-
nent effects, as can be seen in this rewriting:
58 JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8 (2d ed., 1968). In earlier writing, Bain was
less dispassionate: "[T]o argue that sellers in concentrated industries deliberately disregard the
consequences of threatened entry would picture them as unbelievably stupid." Joe S. Bain, A
Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON. REv. 448,452 n.7 (1949).
s9 For a review of these models and approaches, including critiques of various theories,
see Richard J. Gilbert, The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1989, at 107.
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aP(Q)/aqi = [aP(Q)/aQ] [DQ/aqi] (3)
The first term is the slope of market demand and is a parameter to the
individual firm, while the second measures the total market output
effect resulting from firm i's output initiative.
Total market output Q is, definitionally, the sum of firm i's
own output qi plus that from the rest of the firms in the market, de-
noted Ri. Change in total market output is therefore the sum of
changes in each. The second term on the right-hand side of the above
equation can be expressed as:
aQ/aqi = a(qi + Ri)/qi (4)
= 1 + aRi/aqi
The term aRi/Dqi-known as the conjectural variation-is
crucial to an understanding of oligopoly output and pricing decisions,
since it captures firm i's expectation of the response by the rest of the
industry to its output initiative.60 This concept is commonly used to
characterize interactions among incumbents in an industry and is eas-
ily generalized to non-incumbent firms. We represent possible output
responses from non-incumbent firms by writing the conjectural varia-
tion as follows:
aQ/aqi = 1 + aRi/Dqi + aS/qi (5)
The additional term aS/qi measures any output that is induced
from non-incumbent firms-that is, firms whose present output in the
market is zero but who are viewed as responding to an incumbent's
output choices.
This last expression makes clear the analogy between existing
rivals' responses and non-incumbent's responses. Each type of firm
is capable of exerting conceptually similar constraints on the output
decision of the firm in question. For example, an incumbent that is
concerned about entry or expansion may choose a level of output
higher than otherwise, into order to blunt the incentive of non-
60 Conjectural variations have come under criticism in economics for a number of reasons.
For present purposes we need not resolve those, but merely note that in this context the conjec-
tural variation is a useful device for representing the types of responses that a firm must antici-
pate. For a useful discussion, see Richard Schmalensee, Competitive Advantage and Collusive
Optima, 5 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 351 (1987).
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incumbents actually to enter. In this manner the existence of the non-
incumbent firm alters--constrains-existing firms' behavior in a
competitively favorable direction. Of course, entrants are not identi-
cal to existing rivals in terms of their incentives and their capabilities
to expand output. They have different degrees of sunk costs, market
information, and alternative opportunities, among other factors. As a
consequence the numerical value of the conjectural variation with
respect to non-incumbent firms will in general be different from those
that measure responses to incumbents, that is, DRi/Dqi aS/aqi. But the
simple fact that it is non-zero makes such non-incumbent firms rele-
vant to the competitive process.
Focusing on the value of the conjectural variation suggests
some other conclusions:
* If the conjecture with respect to incumbent firms--Ri/aqi_is
sufficiently large, the market is quite competitive and further
constraint by non-incumbent firms might be redundant. This
implies that the elimination of a non-incumbent firm raises a
competitive concern in cases where the incumbent market is
not by itself sufficiently competitive.
" If the conjecture with respect to constraining firms--S/qr--is
sufficiently large, the market operates more or less competitively
regardless of the structure of incumbents alone.6' The implication
of this observation is that the elimination of a single non-
incumbent firm is less likely to be a concern if there are a suffi-
cient number of remaining non-incumbents to preserve the con-
straint.
" If neither conjecture is so large as to render the market suffi-
ciently competitive by itself, then the presence of constraining
competitors makes a difference to market behavior and perform-
ance.
6'1 An extreme version of this case is represented by the theory of contestable markets.
Contestable markets are characterized by the absence of sunk costs (so that firms can instanta-
neously and costlessly enter and exit) and by slower response times by incumbents relative to
entrants (so that entrants can depart before incumbents can lower price and inflict losses on
them). If entry were that easy, then concentration among incumbents would not affect market
performance, nor would it matter if an incumbent acquired one of many possible entrants into
such a market. The model of contestable markets, however, has been shown to have strong
theoretical limitations, and in addition, tests have found it inapplicable to any real-world mar-
kets, as we shall discuss below.
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Constraining firms cannot be identified by examining the
non-incumbent firms that might represent that constraint. Rather, it is
the expectations and behavior of incumbent firms themselves that are
crucial, and the evidence lies with their decisions and behavior that
are significantly influenced by the non-incumbent firm. Note, too,
that constraining firms need not actually be prospective entrants. In-
deed, even if they are not actually planning entry, firms that exert a
restraint on incumbents qualify as constraining firms and hence repre-
sent competitively significant firms.
62
These considerations imply that a merger eliminating such a
firm relaxes the competitive constraint felt by the incumbent firm or
firms. Such a merger-what will here be termed a "deconstraining
merger"-results in less competitive incumbent behavior and ad-
versely affects market performance.
B. Prospective Competition and Entry-Negating Mergers: Theory
A prospective competitor is a firm that is in fact likely to en-
ter the market in the near future. The theory that explains such a
firm's competitive significance derives directly from oligopoly and
merger theories that demonstrate the relationship between market per-
formance and the number of significant firms. These theories are suf-
ficiently familiar and well accepted-including in the concentration
criteria in the Merger Guidelines-that we need not set them out ex-
plicitly here.63 All imply that adding a firm will strengthen competi-
tive forces and improve market performance.
One relevant difference between a prospective competitor and
the additional firm(s) in those standard models is that a prospective
competitor is a future competitor and thus it does not have any con-
temporaneous effect on the market. A prospective competitor will
deconcentrate the market and improve its performance as of the time
of its actual entry. Thus, a merger that eliminates a prospective com-
petitor is anticompetitive in that it prevents future deconcentration of
the market and lessens future competition. Such a merger is here
termed an "entry-negating merger."
62 It is for these reasons that the terms "potential competitor" and "potential entrant" are
not apropos. The effect of this firm is in no sense "potential" but rather immediate and real.
Nor is this firm necessarily ever actually an entrant.
63 The effect of entry on market equilibrium can be deduced from standard theories of the
effects of mergers. Whereas entry involves an increase in the number of incumbent firms, a
merger reduces that number. For an explication in the case of Cournot and non-Coumot com-
petitors, see, e.g., John E. Kwoka Jr., The Private Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Non-
Cournot and Maverick Behavior, 7 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 403 (1989).
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There is a substantial economic theory and empirical evi-
dence that further informs our understanding of the effects of market
deconcentration through entry of new firms. Analytical models of
entry suggest the following conclusions: 64
* Entry can be a powerful mechanism for correcting market distor-
tions. Actual entry diminishes market power over time, but even
the threat of entry constrains incumbents. In the extreme (and un-
realistic) case of markets with perfectly costless entry and exit-
so-called contestable markets-incumbent market power is com-
pletely negated.
* Entry into markets responds to larger expected profits and to
rapid market growth. Both factors provide signals that entry is
likely to be profitable in the relevant time frame.
* Initial entry is often at small scale but foreshadows later expan-
sion. Full-scale entry is more costly and risky, so that most en-
trants adopt a strategy of small-scale entry and gradual expansion
thereafter.
Empirical evidence confirms these predictions, and in addition
comes to the following factual conclusions:
* Entry response times may not be short. Entrants often do not re-
spond immediately but may wait for persistence of profit and
growth signals before committing resources to actual entry. This
represents a caution about the time horizon for entry, especially
where sunk costs are large.
* The magnitude of the effect of actual entry on incumbent firm
margins is not immediately overwhelming. While entry does in-
6, See PAUL A. GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMiCS AND ENTRY (1991) (analyzing existing
data sources on the impact of firm entry on pricing, technical progress, efficiency, productivity,
and industry evolution); Timothy Dunne et al., Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manu-
facturing Industries, 19 RANDJ. OFECON. 495,495 (1988) (summarizing patterns of firn entry,
growth, and exit in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period of 1963-1982);
Paul A. Geroski, What Do We Know About Entry, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 421, 421 (1995)
(summarizing recent empirical research on firm entry and developing seven 'stylized facts'
about what drives entry); John J. Siegfried & Laurie Beth Evans, Empirical Studies of Entry and
Exit: A Survey of the Evidence, 9 REv. INDUS. ORG. 121, 121 (1994) (drawing conclusions
regarding firm entry from 70 empirical studies, notably, that entry is more frequent in the more
profitable rapidly growing markets).
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
deed reduce margins, timing and size requirements postpone full
effectiveness. Entry must be permitted sufficient time to
strengthen incumbent competition.
* Survival rates of entrants are low. Entry is inherently risky, and
no one firm necessarily succeeds in its efforts. Thus, a market
with multiple possible entrants is more likely to result in at least
one successful entrant.
These empirical findings have led one observer to the cau-
tionary conclusion that entry as a mechanism for disciplining the
market is "generally a poor substitute for active rivalry amongst in-
cumbent firms. 65 Clearly, no merger policy with respect to entrants
should substitute for policy with respect to incumbents. Yet these
findings do confirm that entry does matter, validating policy concerns
with entry-negating mergers, and they provide some insight into the
mechanisms. For example, large-scale or otherwise capable entry is
uniquely likely to be effective, but small-scale entry is valuable as a
precursor to more substantial operation. Moreover, the procompeti-
tive impact of entry ought not rely on a very small a number of possi-
ble entrants, since no one or two firms' success is guaranteed. These
findings provide some guidance as to what constitutes problematic
cases of entry-negating mergers.
C. Non-Incumbent Competition: The Evidence
There is a substantial body of empirical literature confirming
the effects of competition from non-incumbent firms on market per-
formance. Of necessity, this literature focuses on constraining com-
petition rather than prospective competition, looking for evidence that
incumbent firm behavior is in fact altered. A standard format for such
a study estimates a statistical relationship of the following sort:
PRICE = f (CONC, CONCOMP, X) (6)
Here CONC denotes some measure of concentration (such as HHI)
that is calculated among incumbent firms. CONCOMP is some
measure of constraining competition (discussed below), and X repre-
sents a set of control variables that may differ across markets-for
example, costs or demand conditions. Data from a number of markets
in the same industry are used to estimate this relationship statistically.
65 Geroski, supra note 64, at 437.
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A negative and significant coefficient on CONCOMP would imply
that price is less where non-incumbent competition is greater, other
things (including concentration) held constant. In addition, a signifi-
cant positive coefficient on CONC itself would confirm that greater
concentration among incumbent firms facilitates the exercise of mar-
ket power, resulting in higher price.
The non-incumbent firms that in fact represent significant
constraints on the behavior of incumbents in some market must be
identified. There are several possible methods of doing so. Most di-
rectly, one could rely on incumbent firm documents to identify non-
incumbent firms viewed as constraining. Of course, documents may
not be available or, even if available, they may be unreliable.66 Alter-
natively, objective standards for identifying constraining competitors
could be developed. For example, non-incumbent firms producing
similar commodities in nearby markets could be presumed positioned
to enter the market and hence recognized as a constraint. Alterna-
tively, firms possessing assets that are necessary, or at least very im-
portant, for operation in the market could be construed as best able to
surmount any remaining obstacles to entry, and hence constraining.
67
Once relevant non-incumbent firms have been identified,
their significance must be measured. Since by definition they have no
current production and sales, conventional output-share calculations
cannot be performed. Capacity might be used as a metric for all rele-
vant firms-incumbents and non-incumbents-and capacity-based
shares calculated.68 An alternative approach would involve taking a
simple count of constraining competitors on the theory that their in-
fluence may be proportional to their numbers. 69 A variant on this ap-
proach would be to take a count of nontrivial constraining competi-
tors, recognizing that those that are very small and perhaps capacity-
constrained are unlikely to significantly affect incumbent firm behav-
ior.
A number of studies of this sort have been performed, one of
which we shall describe in greater detail. Morrison and Winston in-
vestigated 769 city-pair airline markets in 1983.70 The average qual-
6 Incumbent firms seeking to merge would have an incentive to misrepresent whether or
not prospective entrants constrain its decisions.67 Those assets could be tangible (e.g., some input) or intangible, such as specialized
marketing knowledge. This asset standard may run the risk of identifying as constraining many
more firms than in reality actually do constrain incumbent firms.
68 There is precedent in the Merger Guidelines for just such a calculation, where capacity
data are more readily available and/or better measure firms' presence in a market.
69 This may be particularly appropriate where the price formation process involves bid-
ding competition.
70 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the Con-
testability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1987).
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ity-adjusted price on each route is related to the number of incumbent
carriers and the number of "potential entrants," as well as a number of
control variables. Potential entrants are defined as those carriers
(other than incumbents) serving either endpoint of the route,7 t since
such carriers have (a) feed traffic, an asset that is critical to effective
entry, and (b) knowledge and infrastructure relevant to the route.
This definition is based on the proposition that such firms are posi-
tioned most readily to enter the market and hence are regarded as
constraining competitors by incumbent carriers.
The full results of Morrison and Winston's study are repro-
duced in Table 1. As is evident, each of their control variables-for
market density, slot-controlled airports, and the percent of business
travelers-is found to have the expected effect on price.72 More to the
point, each additional actual competitor is found to reduce price on
average by .44 cents, or about 4 percent of the average price.73 This
result is statistically highly significant, implying that the number of
incumbents-that is, market concentration-clearly matters. Equally
importantly, each "potential competitor" also significantly reduces
price, by .15 cents per mile.74 This latter result confirms the separate
and significant constraint on incumbent pricing imposed by firms that
are known to be positioned to enter a market.
Two corollary points from this study deserve mention. First,
while the number both of incumbents and of potential entrants matter,
not surprisingly, the effect of one additional potential entrant is
smaller than that from one additional actual entrant. The coefficients
just reported imply that one incumbent is worth three potential en-
trants in terms of price-reducing capability. Second, further regres-
sions in the study check for a variety of other possible effects. The
only variation of consequence is the finding that the effect of potential
entry is clearest when there are at least four such entrants in the mar-
ket.7
5
Morrison and Winston's study corroborates the constraining
effect of non-incumbent firm, but it is only one of many studies to do
so. A survey of the economics literature has revealed at least thirteen
other studies that cast empirical light on this issue. Most of these also
71 Id. at 58.
72 See id. at 59-62.
7 See id. at 61.
74 Id.
7- Id. at 63. It should be noted that Morrison and Winston's article is intended to test the
theory of contestable markets in the very market-airlines-that the advocates of that theory
most often have argued it is applicable. By finding that the number of incumbents and the num-
ber of potential entrants matter to pricing, that theory can be rejected. Numerous other studies
draw the same conclusion.
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involve the airline industry, primarily because constraining competi-
tors are more objectively identifiable than in other markets. More
typically, markets may be surrounded with partially substitutable
products and a mass of possible entrants, rendering both market defi-
nition and identification of potential entrants much more complex.
76
Table 2 summarizes the results of all these empirical studies
of constraining competition, together with some information concern-
ing their methodology. Although most of the airline studies employ
the same definition of a constraining competitor-an airline that
serves one endpoint of the route-there are some variations. Hurdle
et al. require adequate feed as well as endpoint operation;77 Reiss and
Spiller consider the indirect service alternative;78 Strassman limits it
to carriers with a major hub at one endpoint.79
In the case of the two railroad studies, constraining competi-
tion takes the form of a carrier providing interline service, that is, ser-
vice along one portion of an otherwise monopoly route. 80 Since such
a carrier might be uniquely well positioned to initiate service along
the remaining true-monopoly segment, by analogy to airlines it may
constitute a constraining competitor. Entry into railroad service is a
considerably more costly, lengthy, and risky process than for airlines,
of course, implying that even the best positioned non-incumbent is
likely to have less of an effect on an incumbent railroad's pricing.
That said, these studies are notable for their consistent impli-
cations. Despite differences in time period and data, and some varia-
tion in industry and definitions, all fourteen studies find that competi-
tion by non-incumbent firms lowers the price charged in the market.
In all but two (or perhaps three, depending on the details of interpreta-
tion) the key effect on price is statistically significant. Where it is
not, the studies use somewhat atypical definitions of markets, in
Peteraf & Reed81 or of constraining competitors in Strassman82 and
76 A further reason is that, as part of its regulatory legacy, a substantial amount of data is
collected on airline markets, carriers, and prices.
77 Gloria J. Hurdle et al., Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline
hidustry, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 119, 122-23 (1989)
78 Peter C. Reiss & Pablo T. Spiller, Competition and Entry into SmallAirline Markets, 32
J.L &ECON. S179, S180 (1989).
79 Diana L Strassman, Potential Competition in the Deregulated Airlines, 72 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 696, 698 (1990).
go See CLIFFORD WINTSON ET AL., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE FREIGHT DEREGULA-
TION 45 (1990); Curtis M. Grimm et al., Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago
Leverage Theory, 35 J.L. & ECON. 295, 298 (1992).
81 See Margaret A. Petemf & Randal Reed, Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Airline
Markets, 37 J.L. & ECON. 193, 196 (1994) (analyzing the effect of potential competition on an
airline monopoly market).
82 See Strassman, supra note 79, at 698.
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Borenstein.83  This body of evidence lends strong support to the
proposition that potential competition matters.
Equally importantly, the magnitude of the effect is in almost
all cases substantial. Incumbent pricing in airline markets is con-
strained by an amount that ranges from less than one-quarter of one
percent for each potential entrant" to nearly 10 percent when South-
west is the constraining firm.85 While such differences may seem
large, there is no reason to expect the effect to be uniform in magni-
tude regardless of time, place, and identity of the non-incumbent.
Most of these studies also permit a comparison of the magni-
tude of price effect from an additional potential competitor relative to
that from an additional actual competitor. That comparison implies
that each potential competitor causes price to fall from about one-
eighth to one-third as much as would an additional actual competitor
in the market. The principle exception here appears to be Richard's
finding of an equal effect from Southwest as an incumbent and as a
constraining non-incumbent.
86
In summary, despite some variation in details in these studies,
there is a considerable body of empirical evidence supporting the
proposition that firms that do not currently produce in a particular
market, but that are visibly positioned to enter, significantly affect
pricing by incumbent firms. There should be no doubt about the po-
tency of non-incumbent competition and its importance for antitrust.
In addition, these studies illustrate how the notion of "visibly posi-
tioned" can be operationalized as well as how econometric evidence
can be used to capture the effects of non-incumbent competitors.
I1. TOWARD GUIDELINES FOR NON-INCUMBENT COMPETITORS
As noted earlier, the skeptical view that the courts have held
toward non-incumbent competition ("potential competition") has re-
sulted from two factors: first, the seeming lack of proof of the effects
of non-incumbent competition, and second, doubts as to whether rele-
vant non-incumbent competitors could be identified and distinguished
from non-incumbent firms that do not matter. The economic theory
83 See Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. EcON. 344, 352-53 (1989) (defining potential competition as
all airlines who carry less than one percent of the traffic on the observed route).
84 See Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and
Competition, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 389, 390-92 (1990) (special issue).
85 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winton, The Remaining Role for Government Policy in the
Deregulated Airline Industry, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 32-34 (S. Peltzman
& C. Winston eds., 2000).
86 Krista Richards, The Effect of Southwest Airlines on U.S. Airline Markets, 4 RES.
TRANSP. ECON. 33 (1996).
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and empirical evidence that have been reviewed should remedy the
first of these deficiencies, and indeed, they also provide insight into
the second. But the second concern--criteria for non-incumbent
firms that matter-turns out to be thoroughly addressed in the current
Merger Guidelines, albeit in a form that obscures its importance to
this issue. We address this issue in the first sub-section below, fol-
lowing by proposed guidelines for analyzing mergers involving non-
incumbent competitors.
87
A. Identifying Non-Incumbent Firms that Matter
Our point of departure is the present Merger Guidelines'
treatment of so-called committed entrants, that is, non-incumbent
firms whose sunk costs are significant and hence cannot respond
within one year.88 The purpose of this section of the Guidelines is to
set forth the conditions of entry that render permissible an otherwise
problematic merger-one where concentration among incumbent
firms is high: "A merger is not likely to create or enhance market
power...if entry into the market is so easy that market partici-
pants...could not profitably maintain a price increase."89 Uncommit-
ted entrants are said to be relevant if their entry is "timely, likely, and
sufficient in its magnitude, character and scope to deter or counteract
the competitive effects of concern." 90 Timely entry is defined as that
which takes place within two years.9' Entry is likely if it is profitable
at the pre-merger price.92 Sufficient entry is that which restores the
pre-merger price.
93
These criteria serve to define firms that matter in the sense
that they would respond, and respond effectively, to the exercise of
market power by a merger of incumbent firms. But by extension,
these same criteria can be employed to identify those non-incumbent
firms-parties to a merger-that are competitively relevant. That is,
we can define a non-incumbent firm that matters as one that can enter
within two years, be profitable at pre-merger price, and (by itself or
together with other entrants) restore pre-merger price. While these
criteria are not necessarily straightforward, their use should pose no
greater problems than those encountered at present in evaluating con-
87 See SULLIVAN & GRtMES, supra note 1, § 11.3b3, at 623 ("The need for a well-
reasoned rule for addressing potential competition issues is probably greater than ever.").
8 Recall that quicker entrants qualify as "market participants."
89 1992 quicker entrants qualify as "market participants."
89 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at § 3.0.
90 See id.
9' See id § 3.2.
92 See id. § 3.3.
" See id. § 3.3, 3.4.
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ditions of entry. Our proposed guidelines rely upon these accepted
criteria.
Moreover, the current Guidelines treatment of entry is
strangely one-sided.94 As noted, a non-incumbent firm (or group of
firms) meeting the criteria for committed entry supposedly exerts
enough power to counteract incumbents' efforts to raise price, but
there is no corresponding presumption in the Guidelines that a merger
eliminating that very same non-incumbent firm is anticompetitive.
This asymmetry in the treatment of non-incumbent firms depending
upon whether they are participants in the merger or not is not merely
difficult to understand, but it has the effect of tilting policy in favor of
mergers. The existence of a constraining competitor moderates con-
cerns over a merger and thus makes the merger more likely to be ap-
proved, whereas a merger than eliminates the same constraining firm
raises no automatic concern. One of the corollary benefits of the
guidelines to be proposed is that they will resolve this asymmetry of
treatment.
B. Guidance for Mergers Involving Non-Incumbent Firms
Our proposed approach to mergers involving non-incumbent
firms relies upon these criteria for identifying firms that matter, on the
earlier Guidelines' treatment of potential competition, and on the
cited theory and evidence regarding entrants and non-incumbent
competitors. The approach has two steps: (1) satisfaction of one
structural precondition for concern with mergers involving non-
incumbent firms, and then (2) demonstration of certain features spe-
cific to the case of (a) a deconstraining merger or (b) an entry-
negating merger.
STEP 1: THE PRECONDITION
The first step involves determination as to whether a neces-
sary structural precondition for concern holds. That precondition is
simply that the market consisting of current producers must be at least
moderately concentrated. This determination would be made in ac-
cordance with the current Merger Guidelines and reflects the empiri-
cal and theoretical proposition that only those markets that are not
workably competitive among existing firms stand to benefit from the
role of non-incumbent firms.
94 See id. § 3.
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If this precondition holds, the impact of non-incumbent firms
in general and the non-incumbent firm that is party to the merger in
particular would be further scrutinized.
STEP 2A: A PROSPECTIVE COMPETITOR / ENTRY-NEGATING
MERGER
If the merger allegedly would eliminate a non-incumbent that
is a prospective competitor, the merger would likely be challenged if
the precondition is met and if the following considerations hold:
(1) The non-incumbent competitor has the capability to enter
within a period of two years.
(2) The non-incumbent competitor would likely find entry
profitable if price were to remain at its present level (or rise by some
predictable amount).
(3) The non-incumbent competitor could enter at a scale suf-
ficient to reduce price by a small but significant and nontransitory
amount (or hold it constant if it otherwise would rise by at least a
small but significant amount), or could enter at a smaller initial scale
but with the capability and incentive to expand substantially within a
period of two years.
(4) The non-incumbent competitor is one of no more than
five equally well-positioned prospective entrants, or is significantly
better positioned to enter than any other possible entrant. As noted
earlier, in the presence of many equally well-positioned non-
incumbents, the elimination of a single one would arguably not affect
future market performance.
95
Evidence of prospective competition could take either of two
form. The first is corporate documents indicating serious interest in
possible entry, the basis for that interest, and the capability to under-
take actual entry.96  Since reliable documentary evidence is not al-
ways available, the evidence could alternatively take the form of ob-
95 As with other criteria in the Guidelines, the choice of five prospective entrants has an'
element of arbitrariness. It exceeds the earlier Guidelines' criterion of three, based on evidence
of low survival rates of entrants. Thus, to ensure the survival of at least one entrant, a larger
number of prospective entrants ought to be preserved. Along similar lines, Areeda and Turner
proposed that a merger involving a non-incumbent firm be presumed legal if there were more
than three prospective entrants, and that the presumption be conclusive if the number exceeded
six. See 5 PHILLiP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 1123b, at 122 (1980)
("Mhe elimination of the defendant is immaterial in view of the plenitude of other potential
entrants who could choose to enter across insignificant entry barriers whenever it seems profit-
able to do so.").
96 Convincing documents would be those pre-dating any investigation of the proposed
merger, those at relatively senior levels of the company, and those stating positions against the
party's own interest. Deposition and other contemporaneous testimony should be heavily dis-
counted.
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jective facts about the prospective competitor and its market that
would reasonably lead to the conclusion that it could undertake such
entry. For example, firms producing products similar to the product
in questions, or using similar distribution or marketing techniques,
merit close examination as prospective entrants.97
STEP 2B: A CONSTRAINING COMPETITOR/ DECONSTRAINING
MERGER
If the precondition holds and a merger would allegedly elimi-
nate a constraining firm, it would likely be challenged on the basis of
convincing evidence that the firm represented an effective and sig-
nificant constraint on competition among incumbents. That evidence
could again take either of two forms. The first would be documents
in the possession of incumbent firms indicating active monitoring of
and reaction to the non-incumbent party to the merger. These would
demonstrate a non-zero conjectural variation between firms. The
second, alternative type of evidence would be market data that dem-
onstrate significant responsiveness by incumbents to actions of the
allegedly constraining firm. Cases such as Staples98 illustrate the po-
tency of both data and documents in identifying significant constrain-
ing firms. Academic research had also gone far toward measuring
actual interactions between firms. 99
An allegation of a deconstraining merger need not show that
the non-incumbent has either the incentive or capability to enter, nor
that there are only a small number of such firms. Where the allega-
tion is that of a constraint, demonstration of the constraint trumps all
indirect evidence and other considerations.
C. Other Frameworks for Treating Non-Incumbent Competitors
While the above proposal reflects current understanding and
analytical approaches, other frameworks have been suggested for ad-
dressing mergers involving non-incumbent firms. We offer some
comments on two of those-that due to Brodley, and the so-called
"innovation market" approach.
In two important articles written in the aftermath of the Su-
preme Court's Marine Bancorporation case, Brodley advanced the
proposition that the court had erred in abandoning a strict structural
97 These similarities are what Brodley has termed "proximity" of producers and products
as a criterion for identifying likely entrants. See Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition
Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977).
98 FTC v. Staples and Office Depot, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997)
99 See, e.g., STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIR-
LINE INDUSTRY (1995).
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approach to merger analysis, including with respect to non-incumbent
firms, and had created confusion in distinguishing actual from per-
ceived potential competition. 100  He advocated a "structural-
presumptive" approach that would "identify the class of most likely
entrants into the most ill-structured markets, and then bar large acqui-
sitions in those markets by such firms.""' Likely entrants would be
identified by their "proximity" to the affected market, a useful notion
encompassing similarities in technology, marketing, and customers.
In addition, the potential competitor must be one of the "few most
significant possible" entrants. Satisfying these would create a
presumption against a merger involving such a firm.
Brodley's approach was. explicitly intended to return the doc-
trine of potential competition to a more structural and measurable
foundation and thereby to avoid what he believed to be the complex-
ity and even indeterminacy of other methods. There is, of course,
much to be said for simple, measurable, and therefore usually struc-
tural standards for evaluating mergers, but over time merger analysis
in general has moved away from a structural approach. The current
Guidelines de-emphasize concentration and share thresholds, instead
elevating other considerations to high importance, all in a manner
intended to be consistent with modem economics. A return to struc-
tural criteria for potential competition would be difficult to imagine,
even if it were unambiguously desirable.
Moreover, advances in economics underscore the fundamen-
tally different issues involved in deconstraining versus entry-negating
mergers. As noted above, greater availability of data and more so-
phisticated statistical analysis open up the possibility of isolating and
measuring firm interactions in ways not possible twenty years ago.
And attention is routinely paid to firm conduct and competitor inter-
actions in merger analyses, for example, in defining markets and in
modeling unilateral effects. Similar attention would seem appropri-
ately paid to conduct issues in evaluating mergers involving non-
incumbent firms, as has been suggested in the previous section.
A second alternative method of analyzing potential competi-
tion mergers that has recently received considerable attention in-
volves so-called "innovation markets." Originating with Gilbert and
Sunshine, 02 this approach would evaluate a merger based in part on
1() See Brodley, supra note 97; Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Under the
Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 376, 386 (1983) (describing the 1982 Merger Guidelines'
single structural analysis approach to assessing anticompetitive potential competition mergers).
.' Brodley, supra note 97, at 65.
102 See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Con-
cerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of lnnovation Markets, 63 ANTrrRusT L.J. 569, 571 (1995)
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its effect on independent R&D efforts by companies, rather than cur-
rent production of some marketable product. By focusing on control
of a pre-production capability--"innovation'"-this approach is said
to facilitate analysis of some potential competition mergers. The ar-
gument has been set forth as follows:
Innovation resulting from vigorous research and development
is often the precursor to entry in markets characterized by so-
phisticated and rapidly evolving technology. A merger or
acquisition that adversely affects innovation, therefore, may
reduce the probability of entry into and the intensity of
competition in markets where the merging firms do not
compete prior to the merger. 1
03
The concept of innovation markets may serve to capture the
anticompetitive effects of a merger where the effect on R&D itself is
the key issue,' °4 but for more typical competitive concerns with po-
tential competition, innovation markets are not a well-designed tool.
For example, suppose a firm producing a well-defined product that is
not undergoing any change decides to merge with another firm that
might otherwise have entered into production of exactly the same
product. Such a merger would not obviously raise an "innovation"
problem since there is no innovative process at work, but the competi-
tive problems associated with the elimination of a prospective or con-
straining competitor are clear.
A further problem with the innovation markets approach is
evidentiary. The actual product market is not easily defined, partici-
pating firms are not easily identified, and anticompetitive effects are
not easily predicted. Indeed, all of these issues-thorny in any poten-
tial competition context-seem especially difficult when the market is
cast in terms of "innovation." For all these reasons reliance upon in-
novation markets as a primary enforcement tool would seem ill-
advised.10 5
(proposing the use of innovation markets to analyze the effects of a merger on competition in
research and development and on the consequences of this competition for the prices, costs, and
availability of downstream products).
103 Id. at 570.
104 Such was the case in the 1996 merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. Both were involved
in substantial R&D efforts at genetic engineering and were made to sell off one of their research
programs as a condition for FIC approval of the merger. See Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842
(1997).
1os For similarly unenthusiastic views of innovation markets, see Lawrence B. Landman,
Did Congress Actually Create Innovation Markets?, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721 (1998);
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 (1995).
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CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to restore viability to the doctrine of
non-incumbent competition. We have demonstrated the roots of this
doctrine in economic theory and the empirical support for its impor-
tance. We have shown how relevant non-incumbent firms can be
identified by extension of the criteria already set forth in the Merger
Guidelines and employed by the enforcement agencies. Based on all
that, we have offered some tentative guidelines suggesting how the
antitrust agencies and courts could appropriately analyze claims of
anticompetitive effects from mergers involving constraining and pro-
spective competitors.
This doctrine of non-incumbent competition has remained
largely dormant for some thirty years, during a merger wave of
historic proportions. Many important mergers of that period and
of the present time raise concerns involving such firms, and it can
only be hoped that the agencies will renew their efforts to treat de-
constraining mergers and entry-negating mergers as the threats to
competition that they manifestly represent.
Table 1
Estimation Results on Quality-Adjusted Yields
Variable Definition Estimate
Hub dummy (1 if route was nonhub/nonhub, 2.31*
0 otherwise) (.37)
Hub dummy (1 if route was nonhub/small 1.41*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.32)
Hub dummy (1 if route was nonhub/medium 2.16*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.40)
Hub dummy (1 if route was nonhub/large 2.52*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.50)
Hub dummy (1 if route was small hub/small 1.30*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.32)
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Hub dummy (1 if route was small 2.56*
hub/medium hub, 0 otherwise) (.38)
Hub dummy (1 if route was small hub/large 3.51*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.48)
Hub dummy (1 if route was medium 2.62*
hub/medium hub, 0 otherwise) (.43)
Hub dummy (1 if route was medium 3.12*
hub/large hub, 0 otherwise) (.46)
Hub dummy (1 if route was large hub/large 3.42*
hub, 0 otherwise) (.50)
Slot dummy (1 if either origin or destination .60*
airport had slot restrictions, 0 otherwise) (.19)
Percentage of business travelers on route .06*
(.005)
Number of airlines offering direct or on-line con- -.44*
necting service (.04)
Number of airlines serving at least one air- 15"
port on the route (excluding actual carriers) (.02)
Notes: No. of observations = 769
R2 = .42.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates statistical significance.
Source: Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Empirical Implications
and Tests of the Contestability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. & ECON. 53, 62 (1987)
(reprinted with permission The Journal of Law & Economics, Univ. of Chi-
cago, (2001)). © Copyright 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights
reserved.
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TABLE 2
Economic Studies of Constraining Competitors
AUTHOR(S)/ INDUSTRY/ CONSTRAIN- FINDINGS
DATE DATA ING COM-
PETITOR
Morrison and Airlines Non-incumbent Each non-
Winston 769 city-pair carriers serving incumbent
198716 markets in either or both competitor
1983 endpoints lowers price
by .44 cents
per mile.
Statistically
significant.
Hurdle et al Airlines Non-incumbent Each such
198907 867 nonstop carriers serving "likely po-
city-pair either or both tential en-
markets in endpoints and trant" low-
1985 with adequate ers price by
feed .16-.22
cents per
mile. Sta-
tistically
significant.
Borenstein Airlines Concentration One stan-
1989108 3591 city- among carriers dard devia-
pair routes in at endpoint tion in such
1987 airports plus "potential
small incum- competi-
bent carriers, tion" lowers
relative to just price by
non- less than
incumbents 1%. Not
consistently
significant.
106 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the
Contestability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. & ECON, 53 (1987).
107 Gloria J. Hurdle et al., Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline
Industry, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 119 (1989).
1o Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S.
Airline Industry, 20 RAND i ECON. 344 (1989).
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AUTHOR(S)/ INDUSTRY/ CONSTRAIN- FINDINGS
DATE DATA ING COM-
PETITOR
Morrison and Airlines Non-incumbent Each non-
Winston 112 city-pair. carriers serving incumbent
1989109 routes in either or both lowers
1983 endpoints, in- price, but
teracted with not signifi-
distance cantly
Reiss and Airlines Indirect ser- Indirect
Spiller 113 city-pair vice: one-stop, service sig-
1989110 markets, change of nificantly
1982 planes lowers
price, but
direct ser-
vice lowers
price by
more
Morrison and Airlines Non-incumbent Each non-
Winston 18,573 ob- carriers serving incumbent
1990111 servations of either or both lowers price
city-pair endpoints by .55%
markets, pre-1982
1978-1988 and.14%
post-1982.
Significant.
Strassman Airlines Non-incumbent Additional
1990112 442 quarterly carriers with a carrier with
observations major hub at major hub
on 92 large either endpoint lowers
city-pair price, but
markets, in not signifi-
1980 cantly
109 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Enhancing the Performance of the Deregu-
lated Air Transportation System, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIc AcrivrrY: MICROECO-
NOMICS 61 (1989).
1o Peter C. Reiss & Pablo T. Spiller, Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets, 32
J.L. & ECON. 179 (1989).
111 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Compe-
tition, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 389 (May 1990) (special issue).
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AUTHOR(S)/ INDUSTRY/ CONSTRAIN- FINDINGS
DATE DATA ING COM-
PETITOR
Winston et al Railroads Interline ser- Interline
1990113 1558 ship- vice: service service low-
ments of coal along one por- ers prices
and grain, tion of route sig-
1210 ship- served entirely nificantly.
ments of by monopoly Effect for
other corn- carrier "other
modities, commodi-
1985 ties" sub-
stantial
Grimm et al Railroads Interline ser- Interline
1992'14 395 ship- vice: service service
ments, 1985 along one por- lower price
tion of route charged by
entirely served single-line
by monopoly carrier.
carrier Effect larg-
est for first
single-line
carrier, but
all are sig-
nificant
Bruekner, Airlines Non-incumbent Each non-
Dyer, and 6054 itiner- carriers serving incumbent
Spiller aries with 4 both endpoints lowers price
199215 flight seg- by 1.6%.
ments Statistically
through 267 significant.
airports in
1985
112 Diana L Strassman, Potential Competition in the Deregulated Airlines, 72 REV.
EcoN. & STAT., 696 (1990).
113 CLIFFORD VINSTON Er AL, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE FREIGHT DEREGU-
LATION (1990).
114 Curtis M. Grimm et a]., Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago Leverage
Theory, 35 J.L & ECON. 295 (1992).
115 Jan K. Bruekner et al., Fare Determination in Airline Hub-and-Spoke Networks, 23
RAND L ECON. 309 (1992).
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AUTHOR(S)/ INDUSTRY/ CONSTRAIN- FINDINGS
DATE DATA ING COM-
PETITOR
Peteraf and Airlines Non-incumbent Number of
Reed 345 city-pair carriers serving non-
1994116 markets in either or both incumbents
1984 served endpoints lowers
by only one price, but
carrier insignifi-
cantly.
More im-
portant is
average
cost of low-
est-cost
potential
entrant.
Bruekner and Airlines Non-incumbent Each addi-
Spiller 7732 obser- carriers serving tional con-
1994117 vations on both endpoints straining
about 5000 carrier low-
routes in ers price by
1985 about 2%.
Statistically
significant.
Richards Airlines Presence of Southwest
1996118 558 routes of Southwest on effect on
less than route, or serv- fares sig-
1000 miles ing one end- nificant and
in 1995 point, or serv- similar on
ing neither routes it
endpoint served and
where it
served one
endpoint
116 Margaret A. Peteraf & Randal Reed, Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Airline
Markets, 37 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1994).
117 Jan K. Bruekner & Pablo T. Spiller, Economics of Traffic Density in the Deregulated
Airline Industry, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 379 (1994).118 Krista Richards, The Effect of Southwest Airlines on U.S. Airline Markets, 4 RES.
TRANSP. ECON. 33 (1996).
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AUTHOR(S)/ INDUSTRY/ CONSTRAIN- FINDINGS
DATE DATA ING COM-
PETITOR
Morrison and Airlines Presence of Southwest
Winston 1000 most Southwest or effect very
2000119 heavily trav- of other low- large and
eled routes, cost carriers on statistically
1978 and adjacent route, significant.
1998 also at airport Effect of
on route other low-
cost carriers
mixed.
119 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Remaining Role for Government Policy
in the Deregulated Airline Industry, in DEREGULATION OF NETWoRK INDUSTRIES (S. Peltzman
& C. Winston eds., 2000).
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